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all scaled to fit the same range of move-
ment. In all cases, a value near 5 means
not at all market friendly (such as Hon-
duran monetary policy or Nicaraguan
trade policy in the late 1990s), while a
value near 1 means very market oriented
(such as Salvadoran monetary policy and
government intervention now).
Finally, I narrow the focus of domes-
tic market orientation to a subset of just
four variables because I think they
deserve more attention than the others.
The final four are government interven-
tion in the economy, protection of prop-
erty rights, degree of regulation in the
economy, and wage and price flexibility.
Once again, a lower index value repre-
sents a greater disposition to let markets
work, while a high number means the
opposite. 
As Chart 1 shows, the DR-CAFTA
countries on average have experienced a
marked decline in trade protectionism.
The value of this index falls from 4.5
(high to very high trade protectionism)
in 1995 to 2.8 (low to moderate) in 2005.
In contrast, the measure of domestic mar-
trade policy indicators demonstrating
more movement toward market orienta-
tion. Although the nontrade indicators
revealed more market openness to begin
with, market openness in the trade sec-
tor has long since become greater. 
Chart 1 compares three indicators of
market orientation constructed from the
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom. The first, degree of
trade openness, is simply the Heritage
Foundation’s measure without further
adornment. The second, domestic mar-
ket orientation, reflects the Heritage
Foundation results about market open-
ness in eight nontrade domestic policy
categories: fiscal policy and fiscal bal-
ance, government intervention in the
economy, monetary policy (with its infla-
tionary implications), banking policy,
flexibility of wages and prices, protec-
tion of property rights, transparency and
simplicity of regulation, and importance
of the informal sector versus the formal
taxpaying sector.
These different indicators may not
always be easy to compare, but they are
Beyond the Border
he pending U.S. congressional
vote on the Central American
Free Trade Agreement has in-
creased attention on the trade policies of
the participating countries—Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic.
(The agreement is known as DR-CAFTA
since the Dominican Republic’s inclusion
in August 2004.)
Entering into regional trade agree-
ments has well-documented positive
effects on participating nations, rich or
poor, even though the impact on the
United States would be lessened by the
small market sizes of the DR-CAFTA
countries. From the DR-CAFTA countries’
perspective, the agreement’s impact
could be large.
1 Even the most populous
of these nations, Guatemala, has less
than half as many people as the state of
Texas. Moreover, despite what the habit-
ual detractors of trade liberalization
claim, there is much evidence that trade
openings typically have positive effects
on income per capita—generally includ-
ing that of the poorest fifth of the popu-
lation, even in developing countries.
2
Trade Liberalization vs. 
Domestic Market Orientation
While future trade liberalization is
important, the current disposition of the
DR-CAFTA countries toward free trade is
not new. A good deal of trade liberaliza-
tion has already taken place in these
countries, so future opening is simply
more of a good thing.
The past trade openings raise more
general questions about market-oriented
changes in policies in the DR-CAFTA
countries. Have these countries operated
consistently with market competition over-
all? Have they—as with trade—gotten any
better at it? I use an index to show that,
on average, changes in trade policy in
the DR-CAFTA countries have followed a
different trajectory than DR-CAFTA mar-
ket-oriented policies in general, with the
T
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ket orientation (the eight measures noted
above) falls from 3.4 in 1995 to 3 in 2005.
To the extent that it is fair to com-
pare one indicator with another, move-
ments of nontrade indicators in the
direction of a market-based economy
were much smaller than market-oriented
movements in the trade indicators. Non-
trade indicators showed more market
orientation in the early going than the
trade indicator did. In 2001, the falling
(improving) trade index caught up with
the domestic index and has remained
below it for most of the time since.
The relation between the trade
index and the four selected domestic
market openness measures is similar,
except that the line for the four variables
starts at a lower (more market-oriented
policy) value than that for the eight vari-
ables. Note that the final values for both
domestic market orientation measures
are the same. 
Because the trade openness line is
above both domestic market orientation
lines in 1995 and below them in 2005, we
know that—despite the virtues of future
trade opening—the domestic market
measures have farther to go before they
get where market-oriented voters want
them. While trade is a legitimate focus
for policymaker attention, so are the
other indicators—and perhaps a little
more so these days. 
Certainly it is not true that market
orientation automatically means more
growth than market closure. Many factors
working jointly determine economic ex-
pansion. The Heritage Foundation’s meas-
ures include nothing about educational
quality, for example, or managerial skills.
But when other things are equal, market
orientation seems to make a difference.
Differences Across 
DR-CAFTA Countries
So far I have discussed how trade
openness has moved compared with other
measures of market openness for the DR-
CAFTA countries overall. With six countries
of varied sizes and incomes, we might
expect that summary statistics hide a lot
of differences across countries. Chart 2
offers a current snapshot of the connec-
tion between trade policy and domestic
market policy in each of the six DR-CAFTA
countries and in the United States. Lower
values signify greater market openness.
A striking detail is the tie between
GDP per capita and this trade–market
policy connection and what it suggests
about the relation between economic
development and openness. In the two
richest DR-CAFTA countries, Costa Rica
and the Dominican Republic, the open-
ness of the domestic market category is
greater than (shows a lower value than)
that of the trade sector.
However, it must be noted that neither
trade nor nontrade policy is very market
oriented in the Dominican Republic. In
fact, the Dominican Republic has both
less open trade and less market-oriented
domestic policy by the Heritage Founda-
tion’s indices than any of the other five
Central American countries. The relation
between the two types of openness sug-
gests the Dominicans are more interested
in nontrade domestic market orientation
than in trade policy. This is a trait they
share only with the Costa Ricans and,
interestingly, the United States—the
three countries with the highest GDP 
per capita among the DR-CAFTA partici-
pants. The four poorer Central American
countries all exhibit more trade policy
orientation than nontrade market orien-
tation. 
In and of themselves, these measures
do not prove that income is higher be-
cause of the market-related orientation of
these institutions or that higher income
has motivated the development of market-
related institutions. But there is much to
suggest that the causality runs both ways.
The contrast of richer with poorer DR-
CAFTA countries is striking in any case.
Moreover, while all four of the poorer
countries have less domestic market open-
ness than trade openness, the two richest
of those four (El Salvador and Guatemala)
have domestic openness levels closer to
their trade openness ratings than the two
poorest (Honduras and Nicaragua). This
again suggests a positive relation between
GDP per capita and market openness in
policy other than trade, regardless of the
direction of causality.
Perhaps as interesting as any detail
of this chart is the relation of U.S. trade
policy openness to that of the various
DR-CAFTA countries in comparison with
the relative measure of domestic market
openness. Note that the Heritage Foun-
dation measures are not very refined or
detailed. A scale of 1 to 5 precludes
many opportunities for measurement
subtlety. However, it is instructive that 
El Salvador, Nicaragua and the United
States appear in the broad trade open-
ness category of 2; the measure of great-
est trade openness is 1. However, the
United States has much to recommend
against it in agricultural trade protection-
ism as well as in other historical cate-
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gories of commerce, such as the garment
trade. It should be noted that some of
the same protectionisms that limit the
United States to a 2 have found their 
way into the agreement that is hoped 
to be forthcoming with the DR-CAFTA
countries. 
In contrast, none of the DR-CAFTA
countries have policies that facilitate
domestic market orientation to the degree
the United States has. In the eightfold
measure of domestic market orientation,
the Heritage Foundation’s measure aver-
ages 1.8 for the United States, compared
with 3.0 for DR-CAFTA countries overall.
Clearly, the richest DR-CAFTA nations do
not always show the greatest domestic
market orientation (Costa Rica at 2.8 vs.
Dominican Republic at 3.6), but a large
and significant technical literature on
such orientation suggests that its growth
prospects deserve attention.
3 Also, even
though the direction of causality may run
both from higher income to more market
orientation and vice versa, the domestic
market orientation not only of relatively
high-growth industrial countries such as
the United States (1.8) and the UK (1.8)
but also of Asian tigers such as Taiwan
(2.3) and Korea (2.6) suggests a basis for
growth, despite some glaring exceptions
(China, 3.3).
Conclusion
If Congress ratifies the trade agree-
ment with the DR-CAFTA countries,
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there is much to suggest that both sides
will receive growth benefits. But the DR-
CAFTA countries have already pursued
substantial trade liberalization over the
past decade. In some ways, the new
agreement is just frosting on the cake.
Indeed, for the average DR-CAFTA coun-
try, a stickier problem seems to be some-
what less market-directed orientation of
policies outside the trade sector. Up to
now, market-directed reforms in the non-
trade policy area have been smaller on
average than those in the trade policy area.
It is clear that the DR-CAFTA coun-
tries are working toward more trade lib-
eralization. It will be important to see if
the market orientation revealed in antic-
ipated further reductions in trade restric-
tions—and the improvements in dispute
settlement and other factors to facilitate
international commerce—will ultimately
find expression in purely domestic
avenues as well.
—William C. Gruben
Gruben is a vice president and senior
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
Note
1 Note, however, that the DR-CAFTA–U.S. agreement includes signifi-
cant trade protectionism. DR-CAFTA sugar exports will reflect heavy
U.S. trade restrictions. The agreement’s provisions for the garment
trade reflect U.S.-imposed content rules that make costs higher for
U.S. consumers.
2 An excellent overview of the relationships among trade policy, eco-
nomic growth and poverty is found in “Trade Liberalization and
Poverty: The Evidence So Far,” by L. Alan Winters, Neil McCulloch and
Andrew McKay, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 42, March 2002,
pp. 72–115.
3 See, for example, Barriers to Riches, by Stephen L. Parente and
Edward C. Prescott, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.
                                         